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Review: Volume 11 - John F. Kennedy

Review: Volume 11 - John F. Kennedy


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Praise from a Future Generation is the untold story of the "first-generation critics" of the Warren Report – the U.S. government's official explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy – an explanation that began with the improbable and ended with the impossible. Forty-five years after the assassination of President Kennedy, it seems unlikely that there is much new to say about that tragic event or its aftermath, yet John Kelin's Praise from a Future Generation tells a story that we only thought we knew. Unlike any previous assassination book, Kelin does not argue for the evidence for a conspiracy, or multiple gunmen, or a cover-up, or against the single-bullet theory. All the evidence is here, but it is revealed as Kelin describes in meticulous detail how a small group of ordinary citizens' extraordinary efforts (call it "obsession for the truth") demonstrated to the nation that the JFK assassination simply could not have happened the way the government said it did. In time, the efforts of these "first-generation critics" had an enormous impact on public opinion. Never before has any book focused on the early Warren Commission critics themselves. In this finely written and carefully documented history, John Kelin presents how the evidence came to light since the 1963 assassination of President Kennedy. Here is evidence rarely seen by the public – even by those with an interest in the case – from suppressed photographs that appear to show armed men in the shrubbery of the "grassy knoll" to suppressed testimony by eye-witnesses.


James Fetzer

Research on the authenticity of the Zapruder film has been proceeding at a rapid clip since the symposium on the film, which I organized and moderated at the Lancer Conference in 1996. It includes Noel Twyman, BLOODY TREASON (1998), ASSASSINATION SCIENCE (1998), MURDER IN DEALEY PLAZA (2000), and THE GREAT ZAPRUDER FILM HOAX (2003), all of which I edited. Since the film has been used as the backbone of the cover up from its inception–including the creation of the “blob” of brains bulging forward, the missing right-front cranial mass from&hellip


Politics and Foreign Policy: A Brief Look at the Kennedy Administration's Eastern European Diplomacy

A. Paul Kubricht, Politics and Foreign Policy: A Brief Look at the Kennedy Administration's Eastern European Diplomacy, Diplomatic History, Volume 11, Issue 1, January 1987, Pages 55–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1987.tb00004.x

John F. Kennedy's election to the presidency in 1960 was hailed by his supporters as the start of a new era in American diplomacy. So far as Eastern Europe was concerned, the new administration would apply activist policies to what was perceived as “the Achilles' heel of the Soviet Empire.” 1 It would succeed where the Eisenhower administration had failed and would do so by using trade, aid, and cultural policies to undermine Soviet influence in the region. Such an approach, or so the new administration believed, would not entail the military risks that had characterized Eisenhower's now discredited liberation diplomacy, but it would achieve the goals of that diplomacy: the liberation of captive peoples, the expansion of American influence, and the concomitant disruption of the Soviet empire.

If this was the promise, the reality was something else entirely. For.


John F. Kennedy assassination anniversary brings out new DVDs (review)

The 50-year anniversary of John F. Kennedy’s assassination brings us new DVD releases letting us look back on the popular president’s amazing life and terrible death.

DVD review of "JFK: One P.M. Central Standard Time"

Relive the 1963 shooting with a minute-by-minute account from the CBS newsroom in New York in this extended episode of the PBS series “Secrets of the Dead,” which aired Nov. 11. From the first wire bulletin to Walter Cronkite’s pronouncement that Kennedy is dead, reporters scramble to get the story first but also to get it right. Dan Rather, Marvin Kalb, Bob Scheiffer, Bill Clinton, Robert McNeil and others share memories in new interviews. George Clooney narrates. 90 minutes. No extras. From PBS. Released Nov. 19. Pbs.org

DVD review of "The Day Kennedy Died"

People involved in the terrible events that day in Dallas share their stories, some for the first time, in this Smithsonian Channel special which aired Nov. 17. New interviews mix with rare footage to paint a portrait of the chaos that followed the shocking shooting. Narrated by Kevin Spacey. TV-PG, 92 minutes. No extras. Released Nov. 19. From Inception Media.

DVD review of "JFK Assassination: The Definitive Guide"

Theories abound on who killed Kennedy. This History channel special, which airs Nov. 22, presents a new poll showing 71 percent of Americans doubt the Lone Gunman theory supported by the Warren Commission. The show totals up 311 separate conspiracy possibilities, with blame extending to 42 groups, 82 assassins and 214 people. Authors who’ve made a cottage industry of researching this tragedy, including Vincent Bugliosi, Max Holland, Gerald Posner, Robert Groden and Jefferson Morley, poke holes in some notions and support others. 90 minutes. No extras. From A&E Home Video. Released Nov. 26. history.com

DVD review of "JFK: Like No Other"

The good and bad sides of John F. Kennedy's fabled life are explored in this intelligent two-part episode from the PBS series "The American Experience," which aired Nov. 11 and 12. Oliver Platt narrates. TV-PG. Two discs, 240 minutes. From PBS. Released Nov. 19.

DVD review of "The JFK Collection"

The Kennedys achieved greatness only to be tormented by tragedy. This collection of eight History channel biographical programs depicts the lives of Joe Sr., John Jr., Jackie, Bob and Ted. The best selection is the 2009 finale, “JFK: 3 Shots That Changed America.” Vintage TV news footage from the president’s last day, beautifully edited and presented with no narration or re-creations, gives an upclose and personal feel to the tragedy. Three discs, 630 minutes. Released in October. From A&E Home Video.

DVD review of "Momo: The Sam Giancana Story"

Chicago mobster Sam Giancana often gets credited with helping Kennedy get elected president. Did he also participate in his execution? This 2011 biodoc weighs in on that question as it looks at the life of the much-feared criminal, who was murdered in 1975. 108 minutes. From Synergetic Distribution. Released Nov. 19.

DVD review of "I Shot JFK: The Shocking Truth"

From the fringes of conspiracy land come these two recent documentaries involving a videotaped confession of a convict who says he fired the shot that killed Kennedy. The trail begins with Houston private investigator Joe West, who after three years of digging into the JFK assassination receives a tip in 1992 from a retired FBI agent, Zack Shelton. It leads him to James Earl Files, doing time in state prison in Joliet, Ill. After many visits, West extracts a full confession from Files, but West becomes ill and dies in 1993. In 1998, Shelton goes public and picks up the trail, recording another video confession. Files says he was a mob hitman, had the same CIA handler as Lee Harvey Oswald and was the only shooter from the grassy knoll. Is he credible? Judge for yourself. "Confessions" is 120 minutes. "I Shot JFK" is 90 minutes. From MVD Visual. Released in October.

Also, here are two links to recently released home video releases on the subject:


HistoryLink.org

On September 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) participates in groundbreaking ceremonies for the construction of a dual-purpose reactor -- designated the N Reactor -- at the Hanford nuclear reservation near Richland, Washington. The reactor was the ninth to be built at Hanford but the first designed to produce both weapons-grade plutonium for nuclear bombs and electricity for commercial and domestic use. Kennedy's visit commemorated both the start of plutonium production at the facility and the beginning of construction of its power-generating component.

His appearance was part of a 10,000-mile, 11-state, five-day journey through the West. It was billed by the White House as a nonpolitical review of the region's natural resources, but as William W. Prochnau, political reporter for The Seattle Times, pointed out, the itinerary took Kennedy into areas that had generally spurned him in the 1960 presidential election.

Waiting for the President

The 400,000-acre "Hanford Atomic Works" had never before been opened to the general public. The site, on the Columbia River in a remote part of south-central Washington, had been developed in 1943 as part of the top-secret Manhattan Project. Its B Reactor had produced the plutonium used in the world's first atomic bombs.

Kennedy's visit was hosted by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS), a consortium of public power utilities that was building and planned to operate the electrical generators at the N Reactor. Officials were given just three weeks to prepare. They hurriedly cleared a 130-acre tract of sagebrush and weeds to accommodate the crowd fenced it and paved a landing pad for the helicopter that was to fly the president from a military base at Moses Lake to Hanford.

Kennedy was scheduled to arrive at 3 p.m. People began streaming into the site hours earlier. The backup of cars and buses stretched, bumper to bumper, for almost 15 miles on the two-lane road outside the main gate. Early arrivals put up folding chairs and umbrellas. Latecomers stood, some of them for hours. Temperatures were in the high-80s. Officials said later that about 70 people were given first aid, mostly because of the heat. Still, the scene was festive. Schools in Richland were dismissed at 11 a.m. so that children could go with their families to see and hear the president. High school bands from Richland, Pasco, Kennewick, and Prosser entertained the crowds.

More than 30,000 people crammed into a newly cleared and fenced field to await the president. A roped-off area was reserved for 1,500 dignitaries. According to the Tri-City Herald, so many people asked, cajoled, and insisted on being allowed to sit with the president on the speakers' stand, that organizers joked about having the speakers and the audience switch places. When the president's helicopter finally landed, it kicked up a huge cloud of dust that landed mostly on the dignitaries. The helicopter backwash also knocked down the flagpole that had been placed next to the speakers' stand, sending the flag into the dust with a loud crack. A Boy Scout quickly picked it up and held it aloft while the president spoke.

Kennedy began his 12-minute speech with a cautionary note about the power of the atom. "The atomic age is a dreadful age," he said. "No one can say here what the future will bring. No one can speak with certainty about whether we shall be able to control this deadly weapon, whether we shall be able to maintain our life and our peaceful relations with other countries." Just three days earlier, the Senate had ratified an international treaty limiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the air and water. Kennedy pointed out that he had "strongly supported" the treaty, calling it a step "on the long road to peace" ("Remarks").

Kennedy made several references to peace in his brief speech. He described Hanford, "where so much has been done to build the military strength of the United States," as a place that would now have "a chance to strike a blow for peace." He noted that Tri-City leaders and members of Washington’s congressional delegation had fought for more than five years to get the N Reactor approved for dual use. Adding electric generating capability to the reactor was a "new breakthrough" that would contribute, "in a very large sense, to the peace of the world." He called the facility "the largest nuclear power reactor for peaceful purposes in the world" and "a great national asset" ("Remarks").

Kennedy also said it was important to "hasten the development of low-cost atomic power." He assured his audience that the N Reactor would be maintained as a power source even if the U.S. reduced its production of atomic weapons. He predicted that nuclear energy would provide half the nation's electricity by the turn of the century. That outlook proved to be wildly optimistic. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, nuclear sources accounted for less than 10 percent of the electricity generated in the U.S. in 2000, a percentage that has declined slightly in recent years. As for the N Reactor, it was permanently shut down in 1987.

The president's appearance ended with a bit of showmanship orchestrated by WPPSS. Gerald Tape (1915-2005), a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, handed Kennedy a pointer that he said was tipped with a piece of uranium from the first reactor built at Hanford. "Mr. President, I think it is indeed fitting that the breaking of ground for this particular power facility should be initiated through the use of the atom," he said ("Kennedy Speaks").

Kennedy waved the "atomic wand" over a Geiger counter, which ticked rapidly and loudly while a 60-foot clamshell crane, off in the distance, lumbered into motion. A scoop on the crane opened and dumped out a load of dirt. "I assume this is wholly on the level and there is no one over there working it," he joked (Cary).

With that, Kennedy shook a few hands, waved goodbye to the crowd, and flew off to Salt Lake City for another speech. He darted back to Washington state for another appearance the next day, in Tacoma, and from there went on to Oregon and California.

The wand, the podium where the president spoke, and the chair he sat in ended up in the possession of Energy Northwest, successor to WWPPS.

Dust, Tumbleweeds, and Hats

It took nearly four hours for all the cars to clear the parking area at Hanford. Some families passed the time by listening to the president's speech in Salt Lake City on their car radios while they inched their way home.

Fifty years later, a writer for the Tri-City Herald interviewed a number of people who had been there. Jeff Curtis, a Boy Scout who was assigned to help direct parking, remembered looking out over the crowd and seeing a sea of triangular paper hats, made from commemorative programs and used as partial shade against the hot sun. He said it looked like "some kind of low budget Water Buffalo Lodge meeting" (Cary). Paper hats filled the air, along with dust and tumbleweeds, when the president's helicopter landed.

Kathryn Fox, whose husband, John Fox, was an engineer at Hanford (and later mayor of Richland) had never been to the site. But it was the president who impressed her, not Hanford. He was "very handsome and beautifully suntanned," she said (Cary).

Seven-year-old Mike Wingfield was struck by the number of helicopters he saw flying around. His father told him some of them were decoys so the president would not be killed. "I thought ‘Why would anyone kill the president?’" Wingfield said (Cary).

Kennedy would be assassinated just two months later, on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas.

Governor Albert Rosellini (front left), President John F. Kennedy, and Senators Henry M. Jackson and Warren G. Magnuson on stage at N Reactor ground-breaking, Hanford, Washington, September 26, 1963

Courtesy UW Special Collections (SOC6731)

Senator Warren G. Magnuson introduces President John F. Kennedy at N Reactor construction site, Hanford, Washington, September 26, 1963

Photo by General Electric Photography Operation, Courtesy UW Special Collections (SOC6730)

President John F. Kennedy speaking at groundbreaking for the N-Reactor, Hanford Nuclear Reservation, Richland, Washington, September 26, 1963

Courtesy University of Washington, Special Collections, Moving Image Collection

President John F. Kennedy initiates N-Reactor groundbreaking, Hanford Nuclear Reservation, September 26, 1963


Presidential State of the Union Addresses

Officially a speech made from the US President to Congress however, the advent of radio made the State of the Union a public speech heard by Americans everywhere.

69 old time radio show recordings
(total playtime 58 hours, 35 min)
available in the following formats:

Text on OTRCAT.com ©2001-2021 OTRCAT INC All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is prohibited.


The State of the Union speech is mandated by the Constitution of the United States. George Washington delivered the first State of the Union on January 8, 1790. Thomas Jefferson discontinued the practice of giving a speech in front of congress and instead wrote the State of the Union and a clerk read it outloud. In 1913, Woodrow Wilson brought back the spoken State of the Union and every president thereafter followed suit with the exception of Jimmy Carter in 1981.

Originally the State of the Union was a speech between the Executive Chief and the Congress. However, the advent of radio made the State of the Union a public speech heard by Americans everywhere. Calvin Coolidge State of the Union was the first to be aired on radio in 1923.

Some notable State of the Union addresses on radio include Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech:

FDR also spoke of the proposed "Second Bill of Rights." This collection also includes speeches from Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson ("Unconditional war on poverty"), Richard Nixon ("One year of Watergate is enough"), Gerald Ford ("The state of the union is not good" ), Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George HW Bush, Bill Clinton ("Era of big government is over"), George W Bush ("Axis of evil"), Barack Obama and Donald Trump.


The JFK assassination files lead back to Seattle

Not unexpectedly, the latest release of government records collected from the investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy did little to silence conspiracy theories, according to news reports. That includes a Seattle surgeon’s claim, which is reflected in the newly released records, that one of the doctors who operated on Kennedy confided he misled the Warren Commission about one of the president’s wounds.

In a nutshell, former University of Washington physician and professor Dr. Donald Miller Jr. says that the late Dr. Malcom Perry, the Dallas surgeon who tried to save Kennedy’s life on the Parkland Hospital operating table Nov. 22, 1963, questioned whether Lee Harvey Oswald fired all the bullets that struck Kennedy’s motorcade.

Miller, who later worked and taught with Perry at the University of Washington School of Medicine in the 1970s, says Perry told him there were entry wounds from both behind and in front of Kennedy, contradicting what he told the commission under oath. Perry confided similar details to an Alaska doctor as well.

“He took that to his grave,” Miller, a UW professor emeritus, says today. He claims that Perry, during a private conversation the two had in the late 1970s, said he’d been pressured to change his story and agree with the government’s theory that all entry wounds came from behind the motorcade. Perry had moved to Seattle in 1974 with Dr. Tom Shires, Parkland Hospital's Chief of Surgery, who became Chairman of Surgery at the UW. Shires brought Perry and several other Parkland surgeons to the UW, including Dr Jim Carrico, the first doctor to examine Kennedy in the ER.

Records of Perry’s testimony and public comments, and Miller’s recollections of the private talk they had, are contained in the more than 20,000 JFK-assassination documents released by the National Archives over the past few weeks, including a fresh batch released Friday. Though some of the documents had already been released over the years, they were heavily redacted the newest releases are, by comparison, lightly censored.

For the most part, the documents and an additional 52,387 searchable emails from the government's Assassination Records Review Board recently posted on muckrock.com add to the widely accepted yet endlessly debated finding that Oswald acted alone.

But more than a half-century later, Miller says he, like Perry, doubts that’s true. He says Perry told him that a bullet wound in Kennedy’s neck was an entrance wound, despite having told the Warren Commission it was an exit wound.

If it was an entrance wound, that bullet would have been fired from the front of the president’s motorcade as it passed the now-infamous grassy knoll in Dealey Plaza.

Oswald, of course, was found to have fired at the motorcade from a rear position, the sixth floor window in the nearby Texas School Book Depository. Perry, who died in 2009, suspected there was more than one shooter, the Seattle doctor says.

“He told me in confidence,” says Miller, “and I waited until years after he died to tell anyone else.”

It was likely easier for Perry to go along with the mainstream theory, he says. But he was hardly alone in thinking there was a second shooter. The public was divided and even the government split on the question of who killed JFK: The Warren Commission found no evidence of another gunman, while the U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1979 concluded the shooting was a conspiracy and “probably” involved a second gunman.

Critics questioned both conclusions, claiming the commission and Congress were swayed as much by politics as by facts. True-crime books came to opposite conclusions, and critics raised questions about possible government destruction or manipulation of records and photographic evidence.

Elmer Moore, a Secret Service agent who worked with the commission and was later transferred to the service’s Seattle office, admitted he was ordered to pressure Perry to refute the two-gunman theory, according to a University of Washington graduate student who interviewed Moore and eventually testified at government hearings.

Perry had long been at the center of the controversy, and may have unintentionally started it. He performed a tracheotomy on Kennedy and also attended Texas Gov. John Connally who was wounded by a wildly ricocheting bullet that was said to have passed through Kennedy. Two days later, Perry also tended Lee Harvey Oswald, who bled to death after being shot by Jack Ruby in the Dallas Police Department basement.

At a press conference following Kennedy’s death, Perry said he used an existing wound on the president’s throat to perform the tracheotomy, since it was the precise location for access to the breathing tube. News reports stated that Perry indicated the site was a frontal entrance wound, which in addition to an entry wound in Kennedy’s back and the fatal rear head-and-brain shot, suggested there were two shooters firing at least three bullets from front and rear angles.

“The wound appeared to be an entrance wound in the front of the throat,” Perry told the media. For that to happen, “The bullet would be coming at him [from the front],” he said.

The Warren Commission concluded Oswald, alone, fired three shots, all from the rear, with one of them missing the motorcade and landing nearby.

Perry, appearing at his first major press conference and tasked with making sense of what would become perhaps history’s most disputed assassination, later admitted he was rattled, calling the press event “bedlam,” and saying he didn’t know for sure if the throat wound was entry or exit.

He told friends he was pressured by government officials and the Secret Service to back away from the entry wound claim, since the official autopsy showed it to be an exit wound.

And that may have indeed been what happened. All Perry had done was express some doubts. But that wasn’t the message deep government wanted to hear.

University of Washington graduate student James Gochenaur, who spoke with Secret Service agent Moore in a 1970 interview, subsequently told the House assassination committee and the Church Committee, chaired by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, that Moore admitted to putting the squeeze on Perry after the press conference.

Gochenaur said Moore, who died in 2001, called Kennedy a “traitor” for being soft on the Russians, and suggested that it was too bad people had to die but maybe it was a good thing for the U.S., and that the Secret Service had quickly made up its mind that Oswald acted alone.

“I did everything I was told, we all did everything we were told, or we'd get our heads cut off,” Gochenaur quoted Moore. He was remorseful for badgering Perry but had no choice, Gochenaur recalled him saying.

Some of the newly posted e-mails collected by the assassination review board expand on Moore’s role in badgering Perry and even getting him to flip and challenge others who argued there were two shooters. (The review board was an independent agency that examined assassination-related records for public release from 1994 until 1998, then transferred its records to the National Archives.)

In 1964, Perry appeared to confirm his belief of a sole shooter during testimony before the Warren Commission. A transcript shows he initially said he did not know whether the wound was exit or entry. But under the intense questioning of commission counsel (and later Republican senator) Arlen Specter, he came around.

“Based on the appearance of the neck wound alone,” Specter asked, “could it have been either an entrance or an exit wound?” Either, Perry responded.

Specter laid out an elaborate shooting scenario that included the likelihood that a 6.5 mm. copper-jacketed bullet fired from a rifle up to 250 feet away and having a muzzle velocity of approximately 2,000 feet per second could have passed through the president's back and exited from the neck.

Assuming those facts to be true, Specter asked, would the neck hole be consistent with an exit wound?

“Certainly would be consistent with an exit wound,” Perry said, based on that scenario.

“A full jacketed bullet without deformation passing through skin would leave a similar wound for an exit and entrance wound,” he added, “and with the facts which you have made available and with these assumptions, I believe that it was an exit wound.”

Critics questioned how, based on some forensic findings, a bullet fired from the sixth floor to the ground level entered Kennedy’s back and then traveled upward to exit through the throat. Perry apparently wondered, too. Three years after the surgeon’s death, Miller claimed in a little-noticed 2012 blog post that Perry doubted the scenario. The author of three books and a frequent writer on current medical and political topics, Miller wrote:

“Fifteen years [after the shooting], Dr. Perry told me in a surgeon-to-surgeon private conversation that the bullet wound in Kennedy’s neck was, without question, a wound of entrance, irrespective of what he had told the Warren Commission.

“This seasoned attending trauma surgeon had seen a lot of gunshot wounds at Parkland Hospital and knew what he was talking about. Dr. Perry also told this ‘off the record’ truth to another physician, Dr. Robert Artwohl, in 1986.”

Artwhol, an Anchorage surgeon who wrote an online post about their conversation, stated that Perry told him that “[o]ne of the biggest regrets in his life was having to make the incision for the emergency tracheotomy through the bullet wound… Speaking with Dr. Perry that night, one physician to another, Dr. Perry stated he firmly believed the wound to be an entrance wound.”

But, Miller said in his blog that after agent Moore and others pressured Perry to alter his story, “This otherwise bold surgeon backed down and obligingly changed his testimony to suit the politically ordered truth that Oswald did it.”

That’s pretty much how history sees it today, as well. Of course, that’s debatable.


Design - Decision - Contract

Minutes, Space Exploration Program Council Meeting, January 5-6, 1961 Bird, "Short History of the Development of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Plan at the Langley Research Center," p. 2.

January 6

The Group for Instrumentation and Communications discussed a set of working guidelines on spacecraft instrumentation and communications, tracking considerations, and deep-space communication requirements. Progress of the three Apollo feasibility study contracts was reviewed and the proposed MIT Lincoln Laboratory study on a systems concept for the ground instrumentation and tracking required for the Apollo mission was discussed. Reports of studies were given by members from the NASA Centers. The Group recommendations were :

  • All Group members should be supplied with copies of the Apollo contractors' proposals.
  • Existing ground facilities should be used as much as possible.
  • Jet Propulsion Laboratory JPL should be asked to participate in future panel activities.
  • All Group members should be supplied with copies of the STG-Lincoln Laboratory Work Statement.
  • Lewis and Langley work on reaction controls, Langley research on auxiliary power systems, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) investigations on mechanical elements
  • A call for more detailed definitions of the environmental control system requirements, further investigation of chemical auxiliary power systems, consideration of artificial gravity configuration effects on mechanical systems, and development of reliable materials for use in the space environment.

Minutes of meetings of Technical Liaison Groups on Instrumentation and Communications, Mechanical Systems, and Onboard Propulsion, January 6, 1961.

January 6

"Instructions to Manned Lunar Landing Task Group," January 6 and 9, 1961.

January 9

  1. the exploration of the solar system for knowledge to benefit mankind and
  2. the development of technology to permit exploitation of space flight for scientific, military, and commercial uses.
  1. a manned landing on the moon with return to earth,
  2. limited manned lunar exploration, and
  3. a scientific lunar base.

Manned Lunar Exploration Working Group [Manned Lunar Landing Task Group] Minutes, January 9, 1961.

January 10

Memorandum, William W. Petynia, Convair Liaison Engineer, to Associate Director, STG, "Visit to Convair Astronautics on January 10 Regarding Apollo Study," February 3, 1961.

January 10

Memorandum, O'Neal, Systems Integration Section, to Associate Director, STG, "Discussion with Dr. Houbolt, LRC, Concerning the Possible Incorporation of a Lunar Orbital Rendezvous Phase as a Prelude to Manned Lunar Landing," January 30, 1961.

January 11

After reviewing the status of the contractors' Apollo feasibility studies, the Group on Trajectory Analysis discussed studies being made at NASA Centers. An urgent requirement was identified for a standard model of the Van Allen radiation belt which could be used in all trajectory analysis related to the Apollo program,

The Group on Heating, after consideration of NASA and contractor studies currently in progress, recommended experimental investigation of control surface heating and determination of the relative importance of the unknowns in the heating area by relating estimated "ignorance" factors to resulting weight penalties in the spacecraft. The next day, three members of this Group met for further discussions and two areas were identified for more study: radiant heat inputs and their effect on the ablation heatshield, and methods of predicting heating on control surfaces, possibly by wind tunnel tests at high Mach numbers.

The Group on Human Factors considered contractors' studies and investigations being done at NASA Centers. In particular, the Group discussed the STG document, "Project Apollo Life Support Programs," which proposed 41 research projects. These projects were to be carried out by various organizations, including NASA, DOD, industry, and universities. Medical support experience which might be applicable to Apollo was also reviewed.

Minutes of meetings of Technical Liaison Groups on Trajectory Analysis, on Heating, and on Human Factors, January 11, 1961.

January 11

Memorandum, Markley to Associate Director, STG, "Briefing for Saturn Guidance Committee," January 11, 1961.

January 11

Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space, January 11, 1961, pp. 1, 4-5 New York Times , January 12, 1961.

January 11

Letter, Charles J. Donlan to Commander, ACIC, January 17, 1961 Lt. Col. Ross J. Foster, ACIC, to Donlan, STG, January 31, 1961.

January 12

The Group on Structures and Materials, after reviewing contractors' progress on the Apollo feasibility studies, considered reports on Apollo-related activities at NASA Centers. Among these activities were work on the radiative properties of material suitable for temperature control of spacecraft (Ames), investigation of low-level cooling systems in the reentry module (Langley), experiments on the landing impact of proposed reentry module shapes (Langley), meteoroid damage studies (Lewis), and the definition of suitable design criteria and safety factors to ensure the structural integrity of the spacecraft STG.

The Group on Configurations and Aerodynamics recommended :

  • Investigations to determine the effects of aerodynamic heating on control surfaces.
  • Studies of the roll control maneuvers with center of gravity offset for range control.
  • Tests of packaging and deployment of paraglider and multiple parachute landing systems.
  • Studies to determine the effects of jet impingement upon the static and dynamic stability of the spacecraft.
  1. The General Electric Company effort was being concentrated on the Mark-ll, NERV, RVX (9 degree blunted cone), elliptical cone, half-cone, and Bell Aerospace Corporation Dyna-Soar types.
  2. The Martin Company was studying the M-1 and M-2 lifting bodies, the Mercury with control flap, the Hydrag (Avco Corporation), and a winged vehicle similar to Dyna-Soar. In addition, Martin was proposing to investigate the M-1-1, a lifting body halfway between the M-1 and the M- 2 a flat-bottomed lifting vehicle similar to the M-1-1 a lenticular shape and modified flapped Mercury (the Langley L-2C).
  3. Convair/Astronautics Division of the General Dynamics Corporation had subcontracted the major effort on reentry to Avco, which was looking into five configurations: a Mercury-type capsule, the lenticular shape, the M-1, the flat-face cone, and half-cone.
  • An "absolute emergency" navigation system in which the crew would use only a Land camera and a slide rule.
  • The possible applications of the equipment and test programs to be used on Surveyor.
  • The question whether Apollo lunar landing trajectories should be based on minimum fuel expenditure - if so, doubts were raised that the current STG concept would accomplish this goal.
  • The question whether radio ranging could be used to reduce the accuracy requirements for celestial observations and whether such a composite system would fall within the limits set by the Apollo guidelines.
  • The effects of lunar impact on the return spacecraft navigation equipment.
  • Studies of hardware drift-error in the guidance and navigation systems and components.
  • A study of the effect of rotating machinery aboard the spacecraft on attitude alignment and control requirements.
  • Problems of planet tracking when the planetary disk was only partially illuminated.
  • A study of the transient effects of guidance updating by external information.
  • One adequate guidance and control concept to be mechanized and errors analyzed and evaluated.
  • The effects of artificial g configurations on observation and guidance.
  • The development of a ground display mission progress evaluation for an entire mission
  • An abort guidance sequence including an abort decision computer and pilot display
  • An earth orbit evaluation of the position computer input in a highly eccentric orbit (500- to 1000-mile perigee, 60,000-mile apogee).

January 12-13

Memorandum, John B. Lee, Apollo Liaison Engineer, to Associate Director, STG, "Visit to The Martin Company, Baltimore, Md., on January 12-13, 1961, Regarding the Monitoring of the Apollo Study Contract," February 6, 1961.

January 16-17

Minutes of Manned Lunar Landing Working Group [Manned Lunar Landing Task Group], January 16 and 17, 1961.

January 19

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Aeronautical and Astronautical Events of 1961 , Report of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962), p. 3.

January 19

Fifth NASA Semiannual Report , p. 49 Los Angeles Examiner , January 20, 1961.

January 24

Memorandum, George M. Low, Program Chief, Manned Space Flight, to Associate Administrator, "A Plan for Manned Lunar Landing," January 24, 1961.

January 25

Baltimore Sun , January 26, 1961.

January 26

Saturn Illustrated Chronology , p. 17.

January 30

Washington Post , January 31, 1961 Fifth NASA Semiannual Report , p. 2.

January 31

Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology , p. 121.

January 31-February 1

Memorandum, William W. Petynia, Convair Liaison Engineer, to Associate Director, STG, "Visit to Avco, Wilmington, Mass., on January 31 and February 1, 1961, Regarding Monitoring of Apollo Study Contract" February 13, 1961.

During the Month

Saturn Illustrated Chronology , pp. 17-18.

February 7

Memorandum, George M. Low, Program Chief, Manned Space Flight, to Associate Administrator, "Transmittal of Report Prepared by Manned Lunar Working Group [Manned Lunar Landing Task Group]," February 7, 1961.

February 7

Information from the Apollo Procurement Branch, Procurement and Contracts Division, Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Tex., October 2, 1967.

February 10

Aeronautical and Astronautical Events of 1961 , p. 6.

February 10

Rocketdyne Skywriter , February 17, 1961 Washington Post , February 11, 1961.

February 10

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Miscellaneous Committee Business , 87th Congress, 1st Session (1961), p. 6 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Research and Development for Defense , 87th Congress, 1st Session (1961), p. 161.

February 21

Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology , p. 124.

February 27-25

"Apollo Spacecraft Chronology," p. 6 Bird, "Short History of the Development of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Plan at the Langley Research Center," p.3 Manned Lunar Landing through use of Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous , p. 5.

March 1

C-1: S-I stage eight H-1 engines, 1.5 million pounds of thrust S-IV stage four (LR-119 engines, 70,000 pounds of thrust) and S-V stage (two LR-119 engines, 35,000 pounds of thrust). C-2 (four-stage version): S-1 stage (same as first stage of the C-1) S-II (not determined) S-IV (same as second stage of the C-1) S-V (same as third Stage of C- 1). C-2 (three-stage version): S-I (same as first stage of C-1) S-II (not determined) and S-IV (same as third stage of C-1). Senate Staff Report, Manned Space Flight Program , p. 196.

March 1-3

Project Apollo, A Feasibility Study of an Advanced Manned Spacecraft and System, Comments on the Convair-Astronautics Company Midterm Presentation, March 1, 1961 Comments on The Martin Company Midterm Presentation, March 2, 1961 and Comments on the General Electric (Missile and Space Vehicle Division) Company Midterm Presentation, March 3, 1961.

March 7

Saturn Illustrated Chronology , p. 21.

The Soviet Union launched and recovered on the same day Korabl Sputnik VI, or Sputnik IX, in a test of spacecraft construction and systems and the influence of cosmic rays on living beings. The spacecraft carried a dog, guinea pigs, mice, and insects.

New York Times , March 10 1961 Baltimore Sun , March 13, 1961 Instruments and Spacecraft , pp. 162-163.

March 20

"Apollo Spacecraft Chronology," p. 7.

March 23

  • Elimination of third-stage development, since two stages could put more than ten tons into earth orbit.
  • Use of six LR-115 (15,000-pound) Centaur engines (second-stage thrust thus increased from 70,000 to 90,000 pounds).
  • Redesign of the first stage (S-1) to offer more safety for manned missions.

Saturn Illustrated Chronology , pp. 21-22 Senate Staff Report, Manned Space Flight Program , p. 196.

March 25

Baltimore Sun , March 26, 1961 Instruments and Spacecraft , p. 164.

March 28

Senate Staff Report, Manned Space Flight Program , p. 197.

March 29-30

Memorandum, Petynia, Convair Liaison Engineer, to Associate Director, STG, "Visit to Convair Astronautics on March 29-30, 1961, Regarding Monitoring of the Apollo Study Contract," April 5, 1961.

March 31

Space Science Board, "Man's Role in the National Space Program," August 7, 1961.


Bibliography

Berman, William C. From the Center to the Edge. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

Bernstein, Irving. Promises Kept. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Campbell, Colin, and Bert A Rockman, . The Clinton Legacy. New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000.

Cronin, Thomas E, and Michael A Genovese. The Paradoxes of the American Presidency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Giglio, James N. The Presidency of John F Kennedy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

Greenstein, Fred. The Presidential Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Hernson, Paul S, and Dilys M Hill, . The Clinton Presidency. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999.

Mast, James L. The Performative Presidency: Crisis and Resurrection during the Clinton Years. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Morgan, Iwan W, and Neil A Wynn, . America’s Century: Perspective on US History since 1900. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1993.

Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York: Free Press, 1990.

Pfiffner, James P. The Modern Presidency. Belmont, California: Thomas Wadsworth, 2008.

Philips, Donald T. The Clinton Charisma: A Legacy of Leadership. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Rabe, Stephen G. John F Kennedy: World Leader. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2010.

Schier, Steven E, ed. The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton’s Legacy in US Politics. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000.

Schlesinger Jr, Arthur M. The Imperial Presidency. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1989.

Sonner, Molly W, and Clyde Wilcox. “Forgiving and Forgetting: Public Support for Bill Clinton during the Lewinsky Scandal.” PS: Political Science and Politics 32, no. 3 (September 1999): 554-557.

[1] Thomas E Cronin & Michael A Genovese The Paradoxes of the American Presidency (Oxford, 2004) P17

[2] Cronin & Genovese, (2004), P22

[3] Richard E Neustadt Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (New York, 1990) pp73-5

[4] Cronin & Genovese , (2004), pp326-7

[5] Cronin & Genovese , (2004), P2

[6] James Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency, (Belmont, 2008), pp46-7

[7] Fred Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, (Princeton, 2009), pp5-6

[8] Abraham Lincoln: Lincoln-Douglas debate at Ottawa, August 21 st , 1858

[10] James N Giglio, The Presidency of John F Kennedy, (Lawrence, 1991) pp28-30

[11] John F. Kennedy: “Address of Senator John F. Kennedy Accepting the Democratic Party Nomination for the Presidency of the United States – Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles,” July 15, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25966

[12] John F. Kennedy: “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032

[13] Iwan Morgan ‘The Sixties from the New Frontier to Nixon, 1960-1972’ in Morgan & Wynn America’s Century: Perspectives on US History since 1900 (New York), 1993, P160

[15] John F. Kennedy: “Commencement Address at American University in Washington,” June 10, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9266

[16] John F. Kennedy: “Radio and Television Report to the American People in Civil Rights” June 11, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9271

[17] John F. Kennedy: “Statement by the President on the March on Washington for jobs and freedom,” August 28, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9383

[18] John F. Kennedy: “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the State of the National Economy,” August 13, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8812

[21] George C Edwards III ‘Campaigning is not governing: Bill Clinton’s Rhetorical Presidency’ in Campbell and Rockman (eds) The Clinton Legacy, (New York, 2000), P33

[23] Donald T Philips The Clinton Charisma: A legacy of Leadership (New York, 2007) pp75-78

[24] Bruce Miroff ‘Courting the Public: Bill Clinton’s Postmodern Education’ in Schier (ed) The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton’s Legacy in US Politics (Pittsburgh, 2000) pp114-120

[25] Paul S Hernson ‘Reflection on Clinton’s First term’ in The Clinton Presidency (New York, 1999) P166

[26] William J. Clinton: “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 23, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091

[27] William J. Clinton: “Remarks at a Memorial Service for the Bombing Victims in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,” April 23, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51265

[28] William J. Clinton: “Address to the Nation on Testimony before the Independent Counsel’s Grand Jury,” August 17, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54794

[29] Molly W Sonner and Clyde Wilcox ‘Forgiving and Forgetting: Public Support for Bill Clinton during the Lewinsky Scandal’ in PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol 32, No 3 (Sep 19999) pp554-57

[30] Miroff in Schier (2000), pp112-3

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A Shameful Tale

On the contents page of the latest issue of Foreign Affairs 1 the new shape of American diplomacy is writ large and in italics. In this prestigious house organ of the international affairs establishment&mdashand by coincidence it happens to be its fiftieth anniversary issue&mdashthe subject of China comes close to the top of the list, preceded only by the journal&rsquos editor and by Sir Isaiah Berlin. America-watchers in Peking will doubtless note with interest that the names of John K. Fairbank and Barbara Tuchman take precedence on this page over those of Indira Gandhi and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

The Chinese must appreciate the irony of the &ldquoreversal of verdicts&rdquo (as they might themselves describe it) in the American view of them. What is happening in the pages of learned journals is only the academic counterpart to the political somersault performed by Mr. Nixon earlier this year. It is equally sensational and equally overdue, even if it raises the same question whether a better understanding of China has really been gained in the process.

In his contribution to Foreign Affairs, Professor Fairbank urbanely surveys the new Sino-American relationship, approves of the new China, and calls for a better understanding of the reasons for the old &ldquoage of bitter confrontation in the 1950s.&rdquo Mrs. Tuchman goes back further still to the 1940s, in an essay which implies a reversal of verdicts in its very title: &ldquoIf Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives.&rdquo This is one of those iffy questions which are readymade for wry reflection on what Mrs. Tuchman likes to call the &ldquoharsh ironies of history.&rdquo The title had its source simply in the fact that in January, 1945, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, who for the previous six months had been in close contact&mdashin their revolutionary capital of Yenan&mdashwith the &ldquoDixie Mission&rdquo of American Foreign Service officers and military observers, offered to travel to Washington to talk with President Roosevelt. Twenty-seven years, two wars, and a million lives later, an American president has reversed the unmade journey of 1945. Might not the interim, asks Mrs. Tuchman, have been otherwise?

Perhaps it might, but the question could and should have been raised with a far greater political urgency in 1962, when John F. Kennedy was tinkering (according to his more sympathetic biographers) with the thought that something should be done about China, than in 1972, after Richard M. Nixon has finally done it. A proper understanding of the essential flexibility in the attitude of the Chinese communists, and in particular in that of Mao himself, toward the United States would have been more useful still in 1952, when American policy was wholly predicated on the assumption of monolithic unity between China and the Soviet Union.

It is of course gratifying for historians today to be presented with so much information, in the shape of documents, monographs, and reminiscences, on the &ldquoDixie Mission&rdquo of the Allied Observers Group to Yenan and its remarkably frank discussions with Mao and his colleagues about the shape of postwar China and its relations with the Great Powers. It would have been much more gratifying if these had been made available earlier. By 1961 the volume for the year 1944 of the special China series in the official Foreign Relations of the United States was ready for publication, but efforts by the State Department&rsquos Historical Office to release it were frustrated. Their colleagues in the Bureau for Far Eastern Affairs joined with the Chinese Nationalists in resisting publication on the grounds that this and subsequent volumes in the series would do irreparable harm to the Taipei Government. The 1944 volume finally appeared in 1967, those for 1945 and 1946 not until 1969 and 1972 respectively. 2

What these documents reveal is an attitude on the part of the Chinese communists that was at least open-minded toward the future role of the United States in Asia. They were well aware of the past and potential contradictions between the policies of the US and of the colonial powers in Asia, and the opportunities which these offered for Asians. They also believed that America&rsquos participation in the world war against fascism had strengthened the influence of the &ldquoprogressive democratic factions&rdquo in the US. Mao himself regarded the war as an agent for liberating immense human resources. &ldquoWar has educated the people,&rdquo he told the Seventh Party Congress in April, 1945. &ldquoThey will win the war, the peace and progress.&rdquo 3

As the defeat of Japan drew near, Mao and his colleagues waited to see which way the American ball would bounce in China. Of one fact they were certain, that the US would largely determine the rules of the game. As Mao told John S. Service soon after his arrival with the Dixie Mission in Yenan, &ldquoAmerica has intervened in every country where her troops and supplies have gone. This intervention may not have been intended, and may not have been direct. But it is nonetheless real&mdashmerely by the presence of that American influence.&rdquo Logically Mao went on to inquire on whose side American intervention might be expected. &ldquoWe only ask now that American policy try to induce the Kuomintang to reform itself. This would be a first stage&hellip. But suppose the KMT does not reform. Then there must be a second stage of American policy. Then this question of American policy toward the Communists must be raised. We can risk no conflict with the United States.&rdquo 4

Meanwhile it was clearly in the best interests of the Chinese communists to establish a close working relationship with those Americans already in China. In July, 1944, Commander-in-Chief Chu The had offered his forces&rsquo co-operation in the event of an Allied landing on the North China coast, and he seemed prepared to accept an Allied Supreme Commander in China if the US did intervene on the ground. 5 Mao told Service in an interview almost a year later (though the prospects of an American landing had by then become very slim) that, &ldquoIf Americans land in or enter Communist territory, they will find an army and people thoroughly organized and eager to fight the enemy.&rdquo 6

To many Americans in China, including General Stilwell and (for a brief time) his successor General Wedemeyer, cooperation with the Chinese communists also seemed in the best interests of the United States. In his recent monograph on the Dixie Mission Barrett describes how in December, 1944, he discussed the possibility of communist military support if a US paratroop division was to establish a beachhead on the shores of Shantung. 7 Independently of Barrett, Colonel Willis Bird of the Office of Strategic Services entered into negotiations with Yenan for the placement by airborne landing of special American units alongside communist guerrillas in North China, and the supply of arms and ammunition, in return for the &ldquocomplete cooperation&rdquo of the communist forces (the plan was sufficiently detailed to provide for the supply of &ldquoat least 100,000 Woolworth one shot pistols&rdquo for the People&rsquos Militia). 8

These and other proposals were soon repudiated by General Hurley, by now ambassador in Chungking, in a fit of Oklahoman abuse and recrimination which would be farcical if it had not blighted the careers of many of the Americans associated with Yenan and wrecked any chance for an independent relationship with the communists. But before this happened Mao and Chou had made their now famous offer to visit Washington for secret talks with Roosevelt, which raised the ambassador&rsquos blood pressure still further. In his new book John Paton Davies, who as Stilwell&rsquos political adviser had originally floated the idea of the Dixie Mission, describes how he took his farewell of Hurley on the very day (January 9, 1945) that the Mao-Chou proposal was transmitted from Yenan. After Davies had incautiously wished Hurley luck in his negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek and Mao, &ldquo[Hurley] became quite florid and puffy, shouting that he would break my back and other pleasantries. &lsquoYou want to pull the plug on Chiang Kai-shek,&rsquo he repeatedly bellowed.&rdquo 9

Hurley himself had thought differently when he met John Service a few months earlier in Chungking. &ldquoGod damn it, Service,&rdquo he whooped, &ldquoI&rsquom going to see that the communists get arms!&rdquo 10 But since then the agreement for a political settlement between the Nationalists and the communists, to which Hurley incautiously set his name in Yenan, had been rejected by Chiang, thus leading the ambassador to the obscure conclusion that he had been &ldquotricked&rdquo by Mao. In his recent monograph The Amerasia Papers, Service describes how yet another attempt was made by a group of Foreign Service officers in Chungking, who sent a telegram to persuade Roosevelt of the need to &ldquosupply and cooperate with the communists and other suitable groups who can assist the war against Japan.&rdquo

This action was not recommended solely or even primarily on its military merits, but with an acute eye to the political future of postwar China and the likelihood that US aloofness would drive the communists to seek Soviet assistance.

Although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group but the Central Government have been diplomatically correct&hellipchaos in China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated.

Such a situation would be &ldquodangerous to American interests from a long-range point of view.&rdquo 11

But Hurley was soon in Washington and he had the President&rsquos ear. All the Foreign Service officers who signed this telegram were shortly afterward transferred away from the China theater. The Chinese communists were themselves well aware of the contradictions in American policy-making. &ldquoThere are many US diplomatic and military officials who have come to China,&rdquo they later commented, &ldquowho are extremely honest, and their unbiased reports have made a valuable contribution to friendly US-Chinese relations. But unfortunately there have also been cases of the opposite situation&hellip.&rdquo 12

It was more than unfortunate. From this time American policy was tied to the maintenance of Chiang Kai-shek&rsquos regime in power and ultimately to the extension of military and economic aid to him to the tune of three billion dollars during the civil war. It is hard to quarrel with Service&rsquos conclusion that things might have been very different if the US had followed instead &ldquoan independent, uncommitted&hellippolicy in China.&rdquo If it had, &ldquowe might have found co-existence with a stoutly independent, nationalistic Mao Tse-tung not wholly impossible&mdashand the world as a result considerably less complicated.&rdquo 13

The full story of these abortive contacts between the US and the Chinese communists has, as has already been indicated, only emerged years after it might have had a significant impact upon American cold war attitudes toward China. And this, as they say, &ldquois no accident.&rdquo In the lengthy White Paper put out by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in August, 1949, to justify &ldquothe loss of China,&rdquo all mention of the Yenan negotiations was excised, and the optimistic conclusions of Service, Davies, and their colleagues were left apparently unsubstantiated by any evidence that the communists would have responded to a Washington uncommitted to Chiang. 14 Even when the 1945 documents were finally published twenty-four years later, harsh comments about Chiang were cut from the text, as Service observes, 15 and the scholar must still assemble the full story from a patchwork of sources including some very hostile ones. 16

The combination of McCarthy&rsquos witch hunt and the State Department&rsquos feeble-mindedness which forced Service, Davies, and the others into one form of exile or another is well known. But it is worth noting that, apart from the personal injustices, their treatment also ensured that they were unlikely to want to tell the full story or to get a hearing for it. Even today, as the monographs issue forth from the Center for Chinese Studies in Berkeley and the handsomely. produced and priced hardbacks from New York, their authors sometimes feel the urge to justify as well as explain. Colonel Barrett, writing the preface to his monograph in 1969, begs his readers &ldquoto try to believe me when I say I have never had but one loyalty, the United States of America.&rdquo And Davies apologizes for having &ldquomistakenly&rdquo described the character of the communist government in Yenan as &ldquodemocratic&rdquo&mdashhe should have said &ldquopopular.&rdquo 17

Yet did we really have to wait so long for the CIA to release its film clips of the Dixie Mission in Yenan, for the talented Foreign Service officers to be recast as heroes instead of villains by the very publications that acquiesced in the witch hunt against them twenty years ago, for the Department of State publications to tell (nearly) all, for Mrs. Tuchman and Foreign Affairs to award their own seals of approval? If scholars had been asking the right questions at the right time, the story could have been unraveled years before. They had for example only to consult the third volume of the official War Department history of Stilwell&rsquos China-Burma-India theater, published in 1959, to find a perfectly adequate summary of the Barrett-Bird military proposals to Yenan. 18

Communist encouragement for American cooperation could be documented from interviews given at the time to Western journalists such as Gunther Stein and Israel Epstein, and some of Service&rsquos reports to the same effect were excerpted in the 1951-1952 Senate Committee on the Judiciary&rsquos Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Even the Mao-Chou offer to visit Washington was referred to in a dispatch from Hurley, which the Department of State reprinted in its volume of documents on the Yalta Conference fourteen years before a fuller account was given in its &ldquoChina 1945&rdquo volume. 19

A similar scholarly time lag has occurred with our understanding of another critical episode in US-China relations four years later on the eve of the communist victory in 1949. In his recent book Seymour Topping relates for the first time how in May, 1949, the Chinese diplomat Huang Hua approached the US ambassador, Leighton Stuart, then in Nanking, with an invitation that Stuart should visit Peking to discuss future relations with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. The response of the State Department was both negative and delayed. Topping bases his account mainly on Leighton Stuart&rsquos unpublished diary, but it is clear from his narrative that he himself, as a journalist in China in close contact with Stuart, was aware at the time of Mao&rsquos invitation. 20

In any case a clear hint of this episode was recorded by Stuart in his published memoirs (which appeared in 1954), where he described how Huang Hua paid him an informal visit in which the Chinese official had broached the subject of recognition. 21 It was in the same month that the State Department first tried to persuade its Western allies of &ldquothe disadvantages of initiating any moves toward recognition&rdquo of the new communist government of China. Once again the standard cold war myth of how the &ldquoimplacable hostility&rdquo of the Chinese communists deterred the United States from any attempt to establish a modus vivendi in the late 1940s is totally controverted by the true though long-obscured historical record.

It may seem unfair to John Paton Davies to dwell at such length upon an episode that forms only one part of his personal and wide-ranging survey of the Western powers&rsquo collision in China and &ldquothe fusion of a new order&rdquo that was triggered. But the Dixie Mission does dominate the last quarter of his book it is the key to his final conclusions and the peg on which the publishers hang their blurb. Like Service he believes that America should have stayed neutral between the two Chinas of Mao and Chiang, allowing the Chinese communists to &ldquoretain their independence and develop&hellipas a natural counterweight to Soviet power in East Asia.&rdquo But he also believes that this realpolitik alternative was simply unworkable in view of American psychology&mdash&ldquoit would have let down Chiang, supported atheistic communism, and, at best, been speedily identified as amoral and European.&rdquo

I would go further and say that for Washington to abandon Chiang was, ultimately, unworkable in view of America&rsquos commitment to a new world order safe for its own economic hegemony. However Davies does not share any part of this revisionist approach to the origins of the cold war. His view of America&rsquos motives for entanglement in East Asia is more indulgently rooted in a historical perspective that emphasizes the quirks of personality and the accidents of circumstance. The US suffered, as he describes it, from &ldquoa long-standing infatuation with China and the Stars and Stripes flying over the Philippine folly.&rdquo

The essential irony of Davies&rsquos fate is that nothing in his ideology should have disqualified him from exemplary service in the State Department as a liberal-minded officer of the kind whom one now meets at almost every diplomatic cocktail party. Indeed David Halberstam suggests quite fairly that Davies would have been the ideal successor in 1964 to Roger Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs&mdashHilsman himself having come unstuck for trying to play the China game with more liberal rules. 22

Davies, born in China the son of Baptist missionary parents, had entered the Foreign Service in 1931. He was trained as a linguist and served in Peking, Mukden, and Hankow before the war, witnessing the steady erosion of Chinese resistance to Japan with a lively sympathy which is reflected in the first half of his book. After a spell at the China desk in Washington, he was detailed to join the China-Burma-India headquarters as political adviser to Stilwell, and he commuted between these three areas of operations until he was transferred to Moscow early in 1945.

In his account of these years, the grand design of international politics and the petty world of bureaucratic intrigue are neatly intertwined in Davies&rsquos very personal, almost quirky, but always readable style. Davies meets the OSS apparatus in Washington&mdash&ldquoa pungent collection of thugs, post-debutantes, millionaires, professors, corporation lawyers, professional military, and misfits, all operating under high tension and in whispers.&rdquo Davies first raises the possibility of a mission to Yenan to Stilwell in his bath&mdashthe General was lukewarm at first but later came around. Davies witnesses the incredible Hurley&rsquos arrival in Yenan&mdashMao and the assorted Marxists were dumb-founded as &ldquohe suddenly stiffened and gave forth a Choctaw war whoop&rdquo which echoed around the canyon. And we have the fullest description yet (there is a shorter account by Service in one of his 1944 dispatches) of a Yenan dance at which the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party waddled round the floor in their padded garments to the tune of &ldquoMarching through Georgia.&rdquo Lin Piao, apparently, &ldquohad an eye for beauty.&rdquo

Embedded in this amiable narrative are some more serious judgments on the whole China fiasco, notably on Roosevelt&rsquos dismissal of Stilwell. It was wrong for Stilwell&rsquos partisans (including Davies at the time) to see Roosevelt as the culprit. Rather the episode was an inevitable result of two illusions, first the American romantic image of China in which Chiang had to be portrayed as a stout little ally tugging at the leash and second &ldquoan assumption that the United States could pretty much work its will on China.&rdquo This assumption was shared, Davies implies, by Stilwell as much as by anyone else.

Davies himself had an orthodox enough view of the need to exercise American power in the interests of American postwar objectives in Asia. In February, 1944, he wrote a memorandum arguing that these objectives were &ldquo(1) the greatest possible stability after the war, and (2) an alignment of power favorable to us when we again become involved in an Asiatic or Pacific war.&rdquo This analysis was incorporated in a State Department assessment which concluded that &ldquoresponsibility for future security and order in the Pacific will fall primarily upon the United States,&rdquo 23 and this assumption of responsibility is surely the key&mdashone which Davies in his book does not readily grasp&mdashto America&rsquos interventionist policies in postwar Asia.

But Davies grasped accurately enough the key to China&rsquos postwar future during his sixteen-day visit to Yenan in November, 1944 (although he had inspired the Dixie Mission he was not a member of it, and Service&rsquos reports are much more prolific). If Chiang started a civil war, he would lose it. If he accepted a coalition government, then the communists were bound to extend their political influence throughout the country. Either way around, &ldquoChiang&rsquos feudal China cannot long coexist alongside a modern dynamic popular government in North China.&rdquo

Davies wonders now whether in his reports from Yenan he &ldquounder-estimated the influence of ideology on communist behavior&rdquo in hoping that US cooperation would &ldquoattract Yenan away from the Soviet Union.&rdquo Others have wondered on his behalf too, notably Professor Tang Tsou, who&mdashin a chapter of his revealingly entitled America&rsquos Failure in China&mdashawards merits and demerits to Davies and other contemporary observers according to their degree, or lack, of &ldquonaïveté&rdquo about &ldquothe realities of communism.&rdquo 24 But the question is virtually meaningless because of its inherent circularity: If the US had &ldquocooperated&rdquo with Yenan, this would have presupposed a very different kind of attitude toward the values which Yenan represented. The war would have educated the American people, to use Mao&rsquos phrase, much more successfully than it actually did.

It was these reports that were flung against Davies at the various inquisitorial hearings in the early 1950s, until, after nine loyalty investigations, he was found guilty of &ldquolack of judgment, discretion and reliability,&rdquo a decision in which Dulles cravenly concurred. But the trip wire which felled this loyal Foreign Service officer was more subtly ironic. In 1949-1950, after serving in Moscow, he was attached to the Policy Planning Staff under George Kennan&mdashWashington&rsquos first think-tank for plotting out the cold war. As Kennan deprecatingly relates in his latest volume of memoirs, the thinkers were occasionally &ldquoobliged&rdquo to cooperate with their military colleagues in the planning of &ldquoblack propaganda.&rdquo At one such meeting, Davies advanced a number of ideas &ldquoas to how certain kinds of informational material could be conveyed to the Chinese communist intellectuals, despite the severity of the censorship in communist China.&rdquo

Davies appears to have suggested that American China experts with good contacts on the liberated &ldquomainland&rdquo should be used in some way as a channel for passing information to and fro. 25 Later on the McCarran Committee got wind of Davies&rsquos scheme, now presented as a subversive attempt to employ communists to work for the US government, and it was under pressure from the McCarran Committee that the State Department then allowed Davies to be scourged by his long ordeal of loyalty investigations.

In Peru, the place of his last Foreign Service appointment until he was forced to resign in November, 1954, Davies and his family settled down to making furniture and, it appears, trying to blot out the past. When in 1964 Davies published a collection of essays on American diplomacy, he did not refer once to his own considerable diplomatic experience in Asia and the Soviet Union. On China he wrote that &ldquothe combination of vaulting ambition and maddening frustration fans the fanaticism of the rulers of China&rdquo&mdashit must have seemed a long way from Yenan by then. 26

More than a trace of this same remoteness, this putting of distance between oneself and one&rsquos past, can be felt from time to time in Dragon by the Tail. Its amiable readability, its cheerful acceptance of the &ldquoinevitability&rdquo of everything that happened to China and to the author, is certainly genuine and unforced. But the effect is somehow muffled, the author&rsquos judgment conveyed more in nuances than in the forthright terms which he once employed in his reports back to Washington. To the very end of his book, Davies refuses at any point to clench his fist and hit the table as hard as he is surely entitled to do.

Appropriately to his own mood, he calls his last chapter &ldquoThe Huge Practical Joke.&rdquo It is of course China that has fooled everyone who tried to do anything with it, starting with the Western businessmen, the missionaries and educators, and the Japanese militarists. The United States &ldquowhich tried to democratize and unify it [China] failed. The Soviet rulers who tried to insinuate control over it failed. Chiang failed. Mao failed.&rdquo That is the end of Dragon by the Tail, its final sentence. It is also the end of an argument with which, one feels, Davies might have dealt rather differently if he had been given the chance to make it twenty years ago, and the people to hear him out.


“Man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe….”

President Kennedy, 1961 Inaugural Address

Where China and Russia are currently leading a new paradigm of cooperation and development around a multipolar alliance, it is too easily forgotten that America itself had once embodied this anti-colonial spirit under the foreign policy vision of John F. Kennedy.

Even though the young leader died in office before the full effect of his grand vision could take hold, it is worth revisiting his fight and stated intention for a post-colonial world governed by win-win cooperation. This exercise is especially important now that we are coming to the anniversary of the murder of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963.

FDR’s Death and the Emergence of the New Rome

America didn’t become an imperial “dumb giant” after WWII without a major fight.

With FDR’s death, the USA began acting more and more like an empire abroad and a racist police state under McCarthyism within its own borders. During this time, those allies of FDR who were committed to Roosevelt’s anti colonial post war vision, rallied around former Vice President Henry Wallace’s 1948 Presidential bid with the Progressive Party of America. When this effort failed, an outright police state took over and those same fascists who had sponsored WWII took control of the reins of power.

These “economic royalists” enjoyed full control as puppet President Harry S. Truman giggled as he dropped bombs on a defeated Japan and happily supported America’s new role as the re-conquistador of nations who sought independence after WWII. While it can’t be argued that the politically naïve President Eisenhower had some redeeming qualities, for the most part, his 8 year administration was run by the Dulles brothers and Wall Street, and it was only on January 17, 1961 that he made any serious effort to speak openly about the military industrial complex that had grown like a cancer under his watch.

A New Hope Emerges in 1961

It was no secret who the outgoing President was warning. Three days after his address, a young John F. Kennedy was inaugurated 35 th president of the United States to the great hope of many anti-fascists in America and abroad.

It is too often overlooked today, but JFK’s anti-colonial position was not a secret during his decade as a Senator and Congressman. Even though his family pedigree was stained with mafia and JP Morgan ties to his treacherous father “Papa Joe”, John Kennedy was made of sturdier stuff.

Touring Asia and the Middle East in the 1950s, a young Senator Kennedy expressed his sensitivity to the plight of the Arab world and problem of US imperialism when he said:

“Our intervention in behalf of England’s oil investments in Iran, directed more at the preservation of interests outside Iran than at Iran’s own development…. Our failure to deal effectively after three years with the terrible human tragedy of the more than 700,000 Arab refugees [Palestinians], these are things that have failed to sit well with Arab desires and make empty the promises of the Voice of America….”

Later, speaking in a 1960 speech regarding ending colonialism in Africa, JFK expressed his understanding of Africa’s demand for genuine independence saying: “Call it nationalism, call it anti-colonialism, Africa is going through a revolution…. Africans want a higher standard of living. Seventy-five percent of the population now lives by subsistence agriculture. They want an opportunity to manage and benefit directly from the resources in, on, and under their land…. The African peoples believe that the science, technology, and education available in the modern world can overcome their struggle for existence, that their poverty, squalor, ignorance, and disease can be conquered…. [The] balance of power is shifting … into the hands of the two-thirds of the world’s people who want to share what the one-third has already taken for granted….”

JFK Battles the Deep State

Wall Street’s Dulles Brothers who together ran the CIA and the State Department had made several major efforts to sabotage Kennedy’s “new frontiers” initiative that gripped the imaginations of young and old alike. Kennedy’s program was driven by large scale infrastructure at home and advanced scientific and technological progress in the Developing sector abroad.

Attempting to break that trajectory, Allen Dulles had prepared the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba months before Kennedy entered the scene which was a near disaster for the world.

Just days before Kennedy’s inauguration, Allan Dulles ensured that a pro-Kennedy ally who had just recently gained power in the Congo named Patrice Lumumba was assassinated in cold blood knowing that JFK would be blamed, and every effort was made to back up the French fascists trying to stop the Algerian independence movement behind JFK’s back.

Both the Cuban invasion and the assassination of Lumumba have been blamed on Kennedy to this day.

In response to this treachery, JFK made the bold move of firing CIA director Allan Dulles, and two Wall Street-connected CIA directors on November 29, 1961 saying that he would soon “splinter the C.I.A. in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds.”

Recognizing the insanity of the zero sum Cold Warriors who could only look at the world through the perversity of a Hobbesian lens of “each against all”, JFK not only stood alone against the entire array of war-hungry Joint Chiefs calling for war with Russia during the infamous “13 day showdown” (and parodied by Kubrick’s brilliant Dr. Strangelove), but also took the advice of Generals MacArthur, and Charles de Gaulle who warned him to avoid all entrapments of a “land war in Vietnam”.

On this point, JFK introduced NSAM 263 in October 1963 to begin a full withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

JFK’s June 10, 1963 speech What Kind of Peace Do We Seek? Showcased his resistance to the imperialists in America.

What was especially intolerable was that JFK began challenging the fixed rules of the zero sum Cold War game itself when he announced a new mission to put a man on the moon “within the decade”. This would have been tolerable if the effort was kept within a geopolitical ideology of “competition against the evil commies”.

But JFK knew better and called for a US-Russia partnership to jointly develop advanced technologies together making the space program a project for human peace.

This little known strategic vision, announced in a September 20, 1963 UN speech, shows how an arms race in space, which today threatens the earth, could have been avoided and the Cold War itself done away with decades before the Soviet Union collapsed:

JFK’s efforts to build bridges with Russia were of vital importance as they resulted in the passage of the test ban treaty on August 5, 1963, and hopes were awoken for an early end to the Cold War though the mutual development of the poorest parts of the world. This was “International New Deal” strategy which patriots like Henry Wallace and Paul Robeson had fought for from 1946-1959.

Across Africa, Asia and other former colonies, JFK had worked hard to build relationships with Pan African leaders Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, as well as Egypt’s Gamal Nasser, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and South Vietnamese President Diem to provide American assistance for the construction of great infrastructure projects like the Akosombo Dam in Ghana, nuclear power in Egypt and Vietnam and steel industries in India.

Today the Akosombo Dam stands with a plaque dedicated to the “martyred John F. Kennedy”.

As historian Anton Chaitkin proves in his incredible 2013 opus “JFK vs the Empire”, this didn’t happen without a major fight with the JP Morgan controlled steel barons who artificially raised the price of steel in order to make these projects financially impossible.

How would these projects be funded? Certainly, Kennedy’s industrial tax credit was a major help, but when it became clear that Wall Street banks, and the Federal Reserve were obstructing the flow of credit for long term development, JFK introduced Bill 11110 to begin issuing silver-backed currency through the Treasury rather than the private central banking system on June 4, 1963 which would have liberated America from private central banking for the first time since 1913.

The Plot to Kill Kennedy

New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison famously played by Kevin Costner in Oliver Stone’s 1992 JFK did more than many people today realize in exposing the networks that ran JFK’s murder and subsequent cover-up.

Without going into detail of the multiple bullets that killed Kennedy from several directions (especially the lethal head shot which obviously struck him FROM THE FRONT as showcased in the Zapruder film which had been suppressed for several years), let’s look at some lesser known evidence discovered by Garrison.

In his 1991 book “On the Trail of the Assassins”, Garrison wrote of an international assassination bureau named Permindex and the World Trade Organization on whose boards sat CIA asset Clay Shaw (the figure played by Tommy Lee Jones in the Stone biopic). Garrison wrote:

“The CIA- which apparently had been conducting its own foreign policy for some time- had begun a project in Italy as far back as the early 1950s. The organization, named the Centro Mondiale Commerciale had initially been formed in Montreal, then moved to Rome in 1961. Among the members of its board of directors, we learned, was one Clay Shaw from New Orleans”. Garrison cited French researcher Paris Flammonde when he described it as “a shell of superficiality… composed of channels through which money flowed back and forth without anyone knowing the sources or the destination of these liquid assets.”

Garrison pointed out that Permindex had been kicked out of Italy, Switzerland and France for good reasons: “As for Permindex… it had, among other things, secretly financed the opposition of the French Secret Army Organization (OAS) to President de Gaulle’s support for independence for Algeria, including its reputed assassination attempts on de Gaulle.”

After naming the other pro-fascist members- many of whom were connected to European royal families and banks, Garrison then pointed to the WTC owner “One of the major stockholders of the Centro was a Major Louis M. Bloomfield, a Montreal resident… and former agent with the Office of Strategic Services, out of which the United States had formed the CIA.”

Bloomfield & the Royal Birth of the Anti-Growth Movement

Since both the World Trade Center and Permindex were owned by Bloomfield, his role in this story cannot be overlooked and takes us straight to the heart of the agenda to kill Kennedy.

Not only did Bloomfield play a key role working alongside Rhodes Scholars in Canada such as Justice Minister Davie Fulton in order to stop continental water projects advocated by JFK and Canadian pro-development leaders like John Diefenbaker, Premier Daniel Johnson and BC Premier WAC Bennett, but he also played a leading role as a founding member of the 1001 Club alongside other upper level managers of the oligarchy like Maurice Strong, Peter Munk (of Barrick Gold), and media Mogul Conrad Black.

For those who may not be aware, the 1001 Club was a special Trust set up under Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Prince Philip Mountbatten to finance the new ecology movement as the foundation for a new global imperialism today being pushed under the framework of Cop 25 and the Green New Deal.

Philp and Bernhard were not only co-founders of the World Wildlife Fund in 1961, but were supporters of the anti-technological growth Morges Manifesto which the WWF credits as the start of the modern green movement.

Bloomfield served as Vice President of the World Wildlife Fund while Prince Philip was President, and later gave the baton over to Maurice Strong. The Morges Manifesto was the first attempt to place the blame for humanity’s ills on the yearning for scientific and technological progress itself rather than the imperial traditions of inbred oligarchs.

A co-author of the Morges Manifesto and co-founder of the WWF was Sir Julian Huxley. Huxley was a leading eugenicist who laid out the intention for the new imperial movement that JFK rebelled valiantly against in his 1946 UNESCO founding manifesto when he said “even though it is quite true that any radical eugenic policy will be for many years politically and psychologically impossible, it will be important for UNESCO to see that the eugenic problem is examined with the greatest care, and that the public mind is informed of the issues at stake so that much that now is unthinkable may at least become thinkable.”

The fact that dark skinned people are the most ruthlessly affected by de-carbonization schemes and “appropriate technologies” like expensively inefficient windmills and solar panels today is not a coincidence.

Open vs. Closed System Paradigms

So WHY would those founders of the ecology movement, which is today pushing a global green one world government, have wished to see President Kennedy murdered?

If I said it was because they want depopulation or world government, it would be too simple.

It were better said that JFK was self-consciously unleashing the innate powers of creative reason as a governing principle of political economy. He believed in an anti-oligarchical view of humanity as made in the living image of God and said as much repeatedly. He believed that the human mind could conquer all challenges that both nature, vice and ignorance can throw at us.

JFK didn’t see the world through a zero sum lens, nor did he believe in the Malthusian “limits to growth” paradigm which his killers promulgated after his death. In fact JFK argued against Malthusianism by name.

Today, those Green New Dealing technocratic zombies pervasive across the western deep state are horrified to witness the reawakening of JFK’s spirit in the leadership of powerful statesmen like China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin who have created a new paradigm of cooperation, war avoidance, and infrastructure projects under the growing New Silk Road, Polar Silk Road as well as ambitious space projects which are quickly bringing the Moon, Mars and other celestial bodies into the sphere of our economic activity.

It should also be noted that for all of his problems, the embattled President Trump has become the first American president since JFK to seriously challenge the Deep State and attempt to return the republic towards a saner non-interventionist heritage.

Kennedy’s revenge can best be achieved if the American people do everything possible to support the fight against this Malthusian cancer and push for America’s participation in that new paradigm before an economic meltdown throws America into a new Dark Age.

The author of this paper gave an extended lecture on this topic. For those who wish to investigate this important matter further, they are invited to watch “Montreal’s Permindex and the Deep State Plot to Kill JFK” below:

Matthew Ehret is the Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Patriot Review , Senior Fellow at the American University in Moscow, BRI Expert on Tactical talk, and has authored 3 volumes of ‘Untold History of Canada’ book series. In 2019 he co-founded the Montreal-based Rising Tide Foundation. He can be reached at [email protected]

Republished by The 21st Century

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 21cir.


Watch the video: Πανόραμα Η σεισμική δραστηριότητα και οι κατολισθήσεις (July 2022).


Comments:

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  2. Caleb

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  3. Kneph

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  4. Hanan

    It is the phrase simply incomparable)

  5. Yomi

    I at you I can ask?

  6. Samule

    The debate about this issue seems to be very popular in the context of the financial crisis.



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